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Abstract
Py (pronounced Roo, a shorthand for Kangaroo) is a new stream ci-
pher designed especially for the Ecrypt stream cipher contest. It is based
on a new kind of primitive, which we call Rolling Arrays. It also uses var-
ious other ideas from many types of ciphers, including variable rotations
and permutations. In some sense, this design is a kind of a new type of
rotor machine, which is specially designed with operations that are very
efficient in software. The allowed stream size is 264 bytes in each stream
(or 240 in the smaller version Py6). The security claims of the cipher are
that no key recovery attacks can be performed with complexity smaller
than that of exhaustive search, and distinguishing attacks are also imprac-
tical with a similar complexity. The speed of the cipher is impressively
fast, as it is more than 2.5 times faster than RC4 on a Pentium III (with
less than 2.9 cycles/byte when implemented with the API of NESSIE and
tested with the NESSIE software).
1 Introduction
Stream ciphers are widely used to encrypt sensitive data at fast speeds. Many
stream ciphers that have been used in the past are not considered secure enough
under current conditions. Moreover, the NESSIE project [15] did not select any
stream cipher for its portfolio, as it was felt that none of the submissions was
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strong enough. This feeling also applies to RC4, which is the de-facto standard
for software applications (some of the properties and attacks on RC4 are given
in [8,9,10,11,13,14,18,7,12]). These problems in stream ciphers directed many
applications (such as cellular phones) to make a shift from stream ciphers to
block ciphers. The feeling was that the current technology in stream ciphers in
inferior to the technology of block ciphers in terms of security. In order to solve
this problem, and create a portfolio of secure stream ciphers, the Ecrypt project
had recently made a call for designs of new stream ciphers (see [6]). This paper
is a response to this call.
In this paper we propose a new stream cipher, called Py (written in the
Cyrillic alphabet, thus pronounced Roo). This cipher is very fast in software,
and is claimed to be very secure. The main building block of Py is called rolling
arrays. These arrays are rotated and updated over time in a way that allows
both the data to be updated very quickly and a very efficient implementation.
The design of Py is built upon a long history of experience, by many people, of
the design of stream ciphers as well as of block ciphers. In particular, rolling
arrays are related to rotor machines (e.g., Enigma), and Feedback Shift Registers
(FSR’s). Other parts of the design use other operations studied in the literature,
including permutations (as in RC4), and variable rotations (as in RC5 [17]).
Py is a stream cipher designed for very fast and secure encryption of ex-
tremely long streams. It is intended for use with keys of up to 256 bits (32
bytes), and initial values (IVs) of up to 128 bits (16 bytes) (but it also allows
longer keys of up to 256 bytes, and IV sizes up to 64 bytes; keys and IVs should
be in multiples of a byte, and at least one byte in length). The streams gener-
ated for a given pair of key and IV is restricted to lengths of up to 264 bytes,
which is long enough for any practical purpose, but does not require the ex-
tra precautions that would be required for still longer streams. In particular,
protection against distinguishing attacks on variants with longer streams may
require additional operations to verify that the distribution of the values of the
32-bit output words is extremely close to uniform, and that these words are
extremely independent.
The speed of Py is very impressive. According to the NESSIE performance
document [16], RC4 spends about 7.3 cycles/byte for stream generation on a
Pentium III, and many competitors are even slower. Py spends only about 2.85
cycles/byte on stream generation in its efficient implementation (when generat-
ing long streams, the most efficient case is when the code generates about 32K
bytes at a time). This speed is about 2.5 times faster than RC4. This ratio is
consistent also when running on other kinds of processors (in the range of 2.4–3).
The Speed of RC4 and Py on several processors is given in Table 1 (the speed
is measured by the NESSIE test suite under the NESSIE API for synchronous
stream ciphers). On Pentium III, the key setup time is 2727 cycles, and the
2
Pentium III Alpha Sun Sparc Mac
Py (cycles/byte) 2.85 4.3 5.7 4.1
Py6 (cycles/byte) 2.82 4.6 6.0 4.3
RC4 (cycles/byte) 7.3 12.6 13.9 10.2
Table 1. Speed of Py and Py6 on Several Processors, Compared to RC4 (more
information on the speed is given in Table 2).
IV setup time is 4092 cycles. The internal loop of Py under the NESSIE API
has 32 machine instructions (when compiled by gcc), including the loop control
operations, and it generates eight bytes. Note that under some non-standard
API’s, Py may be even slightly faster, due to the ability to remove some of the
restrictions set by the API (such as extra registers needed to keep the location
of the output, and copying of the arrays). Though it is very fast, Py is claimed
to be very secure, and has none of the bad properties that have been already
found for RC4.
A second variant of Py, called Py6, intended for shorter streams, is also
presented. This variant has smaller rolling arrays, thus its key setup and IV
setup are much faster than of Py, and take 796 and 1464 cycles, respectively
(see Table 1). The stream generation speed is essentially similar to that of
Py. Therefore, when encrypting stream of 100–150 bytes or more, the total key
setup, IV setup and stream generation time of Py6 will already be faster than
the corresponding times of other standard ciphers, such as AES and RC4. After
about 500 bytes the time ratio is about 2 compared to AES and 1.6 compared
to RC4.
The paper is organized as follows: In Section 2 we describe the idea of
rolling arrays, the way they can be efficiently implemented, and basic facts on
their usage in Py. In Section 3 we describe the key stream generation step of
Py. In Section 4 we describe the key schedule, and in Section 5 we describe the
IV schedule. In Section 6 we discuss the security of Py. In Section 7 a variant
for shorter streams, called Py6, is presented. Finally, Section 8 summarizes the
paper. In the appendices we give some more information for the Ecrypt contest,
and answer some frequently asked questions.
2 Rolling Arrays
A rolling array is a vector whose units (which may be either bytes of words, or
other memory units) are cyclically rotated every rotation step by one unit, i.e.,
it is similar to a rotor (e.g., of Enigma) that shifts it’s entries by one location
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Rolling Array with Swap Rolling Array with Addition
given k given v
swap(S[0], S[k]); S[0]+=v
rotate(S) rotate(S)
Figure 1. Examples of Rolling Arrays (the arrays are denoted by
S[0, . . . , N − 1]), and rotate(S) is {tmp=S[0], S[0]=S[1], S[1]=S[2], . . . ,
S[N − 1]=tmp}.
every step. Rolling arrays are formed with an additional fundamental operation,
which is performed as an integral part of the rotation of the array. Two examples
of such operations are a swap operation (as in RC4), and an addition operation.
In the first case, where a swap operation is performed, for some entry k, the
swap exchanges entry 0 and entry k, and then the rotation is performed. In the
second case, where an addition is performed, a value is computed by the calling
algorithm, and when the array is rotated, this value is added to the content of
entry 0. The entry 0 becomes the last entry. These two examples are outlined
in Figure 1.
A useful property of rolling arrays is that if you access the same entry in two
consecutive steps, the contents of this entry are expected to be different (unlike
in static arrays where they are expected to be the same). This property is very
useful for increasing the speed of mixing the internal state of the cipher.
At first glance, a rolling array would be thought to be very inefficient in
software, as all the entries of the array must be copied every step. However,
careful observation reveals that if we define the array with extra entries at its
end, and use a pointer to the beginning of the array, we can perform the above
operations very efficiently, in about the same number of operations that are
required to perform the fundamental operation without the rotation. The trick
is to assign the new value of the entry S[0] to S[N ] instead, where N is the
size of the array (S[N ] is the first extra entry after the last entry), and then
incrementing the pointer to the beginning of the array so that the new S[0] to
S[255] is the old S[1] to S[256]. This way, the array behaves like a caterpillar
that crawls from one location to the next every step. Figure 2 shows this efficient
implementation. Note that in contrast to other possible implementations that
would keep the entries in the same location, but keep a running index of the
beginning of the array, while computing the indices modulo the size of the
array, we access the array without any modular operation on the indices, saving
a large number of operations (and saving pipeline stalls due to the dependencies
between the instructions).
In the cipher that we propose in this paper we use two rolling arrays, which
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Rolling Array with Swap Rolling Array with Addition
given k given v
S[N ]=S[k]; S[k]=S[0] S[N ]=S[0]+v
S++ S++
Figure 2. An Efficient Implementation of the Examples of Figure 1 (now the
initial contents of the arrays are indexed by S[0, . . . , N − 1], but the actual size
of the array is larger, with entries S[N ], S[N + 1], S[N + 2], etc.).
affect each other. One is a permutation P of all 256 byte values, which is
updated by one swap every step. The other is an array Y of 260 words of
32 bits, indexed in the range −3, . . . , 256 (the first entry is indexed by −3
for simplicity of the indirect accesses, but of course all entries of the array are
rotated, and the oldest entry, indexed −3, is updated). The update operation
accesses other entries of Y , some of them are accessed directly (e.g., Y [256]),
and others are accessed indirectly through a value in P (e.g., Y [P [26]]). The
state is updated by swapping two entries of P (entry 0 and an entry that is
selected using a value of Y ), setting a new value for Y [−3] in an invertible way
(in order to ensure that the state space is not collapsed to a smaller subspace),
and rotating the arrays.
The indirect accesses through P add a large amount of complexity to the
mixing process, in a way that is highly non-linear and hard for a cryptanalyst to
follow. A nice and useful property of indirect accesses through P is that when
we access several entries in such a way (e.g., Y [P [1]] and Y [P [6]]) in the same
step, we are assured that the accessed entries in Y are different, as the content
of P is a permutation. As the direct accesses to Y access entries outside the
range 0, . . . , 255, all the entries accessed in Y in each step are different.
3 The Cipher Py
The cipher Py maintains two rolling arrays P and Y and one word variable s. P
is an array of 256 bytes that contains a permutation of all the values 0, . . . , 255,
and Y is an array of 260 32-bit words, indexed −3, . . . , 256. In each step of the
cipher the two arrays are rotated, and two output words (a total of eight bytes)
are computed. The word s is updated by mixing two words of Y into it, where
the two words are indirectly selected by indices from P , and then a variable
rotation is performed, which rotates s by a number of bits which is taken from
another entry of P .
The update of the rolling array (i.e., entry Y [−3]), and the computation
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/* swap and rotate P */
swap(P [0], P [Y [185]&0xFF]);
rotate(P );
/* Update s */
s+=Y [P [72]]− Y [P [239]];
s=ROTL32(s, ((P [116] + 18)&31));
/* Output 8 bytes (least significant byte first) */
output ((ROTL32(s, 25)⊕ Y [256]) + Y [P [26]]);
output (( s ⊕ Y [−1]) + Y [P [208]]);
/* Update and rotate Y */
Y [−3]=(ROTL32(s, 14)⊕ Y [−3]) + Y [P [153]];
rotate(Y );
Figure 3. A (Non-Optimized) Step of Py (The state consists of a 32-bit variable
s and two rolling arrays P [0, . . . , 255] and Y [−3, . . . , 256]).
of the two output words are very similar: take a rotated value of s, XOR it
with a value of Y (with a direct access to a fixed entry of Y ), and add a value
from Y which is accessed indirectly through a fixed entry of P . When up-
dating Y [−3], the direct access to Y accesses Y [−3], and the result is then
returned to it (or to Y [257] in the efficient implementation) to ensure that
the step is invertible. The set of ten fixed indices used to access Y and P
({−3,−1, 26, 72, 116, 153, 185, 208, 239, 256}) was selected as a difference free
set [4] (i.e., all differences between pairs of indices are different) both modulo
260 and modulo 256.
A step of Py is outlined in Figure 3.
4 The Key Schedule
The key schedule of Py initializes the array Y (and only the array Y ) from the
key. In order to have a fast non-linear mixing, it uses an 8x8-bit S box, which
appears in Figure 4.1
The key setup starts by initializing a 32-bit word s to depend on the key
size, IV size, and the first and last bytes of the key, by setting one of its bytes
1The generation of this S box can be seen in the initialization function in the source code.
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unsigned char internal permutation[256]={
B3, 99, 0D, 24, 41, 7F, E6, 21, 77, 2F, FB, A9, C0, E0, 37, 11,
A4, 94, 38, 95, 97, 22, CD, 8F, D8, 43, B2, D7, 16, 20, C2, 55,
C5, 8C, 96, 1A, FE, 4F, 9C, 02, 7C, BC, 04, E1, 46, 6A, 70, FF,
EB, C7, 1C, 05, 19, 83, 13, 28, B9, C3, 12, 89, 98, 6F, 4D, B8,
45, AA, F6, 9B, 36, 26, FD, 56, D4, 6E, 2B, 7D, AC, DB, CE, F0,
92, D3, 5C, 09, E5, 71, 65, 3E, 9E, 60, 7E, 6B, BD, 23, CF, 2E,
4B, F5, 62, 3D, 00, 9D, F1, 5F, 50, 61, DF, B4, A3, 17, ED, 88,
30, F9, F3, 48, 06, EE, 39, 42, 64, 79, 73, 5E, 93, A0, 32, 8A,
8D, B0, 0F, BA, 4C, BB, FC, B1, 85, 86, F2, A7, 15, 87, D1, 63,
F4, B5, F7, 40, EC, DC, 58, 81, 31, 5A, C6, C4, 4A, 57, B7, EA,
35, E7, 0E, A1, 51, 34, 0B, 9F, C9, E8, A6, DD, DA, 1F, F8, C8,
07, 4E, A8, 0A, E4, 03, 75, 78, AB, E3, 2C, 0C, D0, 2A, 8E, 10,
E9, CC, 54, AE, 3B, 6D, D6, 3A, 90, 47, 8B, 25, 84, 66, 01, A5,
76, 3C, 49, 82, 1B, D5, D9, 6C, 7B, E2, 18, 91, 2D, 67, 7A, 68,
80, 14, AF, 27, CA, 72, 9A, 5D, AD, EF, 5B, 69, DE, 3F, A2, 59,
08, 74, CB, BF, 52, 53, 33, C1, 44, 1E, D2, 29, 1D, FA, BE, B6
};
Figure 4. The Internal Permutation of the Key Setup and IV Setup (in hex).
to be the value of the internal permutation applied on the key size (minus one,
to ensure it is in the range 0–255). The next byte applies the permutation in
the same way on the IV, but this time it is XORed with the previous computed
byte before the application of the permutation. Then similarly it is applied to
the first key byte (without minus one), and then to the last key byte. Now, after
s is a mixture of the key size and IV size (and two key bytes), it is mixed with
the key twice: for each key byte, the key byte is added to s, and the internal
permutation is applied on the least significant byte of s. In the first pass, the
result is XORed to s rotated by eight bits, to form the new s. In the second
pass it is added to s rotated by eight bits, and the sum is XORed into s. All
these operations generate a value of s that highly depends on the key and size
parameters in a relatively small number of operations. This s is then used with
the key to initialize Y , in the following way: for each entry in Y , take the next
byte of the key, cyclically, starting from the first byte, and add it to s. Apply the
internal permutation on the least significant byte of the result (thus, it highly
depends on the key byte), and XOR the result of the permutation to s rotated
by eight bits. This result is the next entry of Y as well as the new value of s.
The key setup can be seen in Figure 5.
Note that the entries of the initial array Y are not fully independent, but this
property will be canceled by the IV setup. Also note that in the pseudo code
we mark the rolling arrays with parentheses (e.g., Y (·)), while regular arrays
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keysizeb=size of key in bytes;
ivsizeb=size of IV in bytes;
YMININD = -3; YMAXIND = 256;
s = internal_permutation[keysizeb-1];
s = (s<<8) | internal_permutation[(s ^ (ivsizeb-1))&0xFF];
s = (s<<8) | internal_permutation[(s ^ key[0])&0xFF];
s = (s<<8) | internal_permutation[(s ^ key[keysizeb-1])&0xFF];
for(j=0; j<keysizeb; j++)
{
s = s + key[j];
s0 = internal_permutation[s&0xFF];
s = ROTL32(s, 8) ^ (u32)s0;
}
/* Again */
for(j=0; j<keysizeb; j++)
{
s = s + key[j];
s0 = internal_permutation[s&0xFF];
s ^= ROTL32(s, 8) + (u32)s0;
}
for(i=YMININD, j=0; i<=YMAXIND; i++)
{
s = s + key[j];
s0 = internal_permutation[s&0xFF];
Y(i) = s = ROTL32(s, 8) ^ (u32)s0;
j = (j+1) mod keysizeb;
}
Figure 5. The Key Setup.
are marked with brackets (e.g., key[·]).
5 The IV Schedule
The IV schedule of Py is divided to two parts: the first initializes the P array
(and an EIV array). The second part updates the P and Y array with the
rolling array technique (with operations that are similar to — but are not the
same as — a step of Py), and initializes s. The usage of a rolling array does
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not modify the original content of the Y array, so that it can be used again in
further IV setups.
The first part starts by generating a permutation P , which serves as a base
for later changes. It takes two bytes of the IV (unless the IV size is only one
byte, in which case this byte is taken twice), and mixes them with some bytes
that depend on the key (i.e., from array Y ) in order to generate coefficients v
and d (d must be odd) for an affine permutation P ′(i) = (di + v) mod 256. The
output of this affine permutation is then subjected to the internal permutation
of Py, to become the initial value of the permutation P , before it is updated by
the rolling array technique along with Y .
Then, another rolling array EIV is initialized, of the same size as the initial
value, along with a word s. This array is used only in the IV setup, and is
ignored later. The value of s is initialized by the concatenation of the four bytes
v, d, P (254) and P (255), and then XORed by the sum of the first and last
words of Y , in order to make it key dependent. Then, two very similar passes
of update by the IV are performed. The idea is similar to the idea in the key
setup: a byte of the IV is added to s, but in the IV setup a word from Y is
also mixed to increase the dependence on the key. The least significant byte is
subjected to the internal permutation, and the output becomes the value of the
corresponding entry in the new EIV array. Finally, the output is also added
to a rotated version of s to form the new s. In the second pass, the only two
differences are that different words of Y are used (the last ones instead of the
first ones), and that the output of the internal permutation is added to the
already existing content of EIV , instead of being assigned into it.
The second part of the IV setup use the technique of rolling arrays to update
P and Y , while still handling the array EIV . When performed in an array of
2 ·260 = 520 entries, the first 260 entries of Y remain dependent on the key only,
and the remaining 260 form the result of the IV setup. This calculation runs the
rolling array 260 steps: In each step EIV is updated first, then P is updated,
and finally Y is updated. EIV is updated by XORing its oldest byte with the
least significant byte of s, in order to generate the new byte. The result, which
we call now x0, is then used as the index of the byte in P which is exchanged
with its oldest byte (i.e., that becomes the new byte). Finally, the new word of
Y is computed with a similar function as used three times in the main step of
Py, where s is not rotated, the word of Y is the oldest word, and the indirect
access through P is replaced by an indirect access using x0. The new Y is also
set to be the new s.
After the Y and P arrays are set, it remains to set the value of s of the initial
state. This value is the sum of the last s and of Y (26) + Y (153) + Y (208) (the
three indices are those that are used for the indirect accesses through P in the
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/* Create an initial permutation */
u8 v= iv[0] ^ ((Y(0)>>16)&0xFF);
u8 d=(iv[1 mod ivsizeb] ^ ((Y(1)>>16)&0xFF))|1;
for(i=0; i<256; i++)
{
P(i)=internal_permutation[v];
v+=d;
}
/* Now P is a permutation */
/* Initial s */
s = ((u32)v<<24)^((u32)d<<16)^((u32)P(254)<<8)^((u32)P(255));
s ^= Y(YMININD)+Y(YMAXIND);
for(i=0; i<ivsizeb; i++)
{
s = s + iv[i] + Y(YMININD+i);
u8 s0 = P(s&0xFF);
EIV(i) = s0;
s = ROTL32(s, 8) ^ (u32)s0;
}
/* Again, but with the last words of Y, and update EIV */
for(i=0; i<ivsizeb; i++)
{
s = s + iv[i] + Y(YMAXIND-i);
u8 s0 = P(s&0xFF);
EIV(i) += s0;
s = ROTL32(s, 8) ^ (u32)s0;
}
Figure 6. The IV Setup — Part 1 — Initialization of P and EIV (Initializes
two rolling arrays: P (0, . . . , 255), EIV (0, . . . , ivsizeb − 1), and the value of the
word s. The rolling array Y made in the key setup is also used here).
main step of Py). We observed that if the content of Y is fully zero and s is also
zero, their content will remain zero for ever by the main step of Py. This case is
very unexpected, and we actually belive it cannot happen. However, to ensure
that it will never happen, we decided to ensure that s will never be zero at the
initial state. We do this by setting it to keysize+ROTL32(ivsize,16)+87654321x
in case it is zero (the keysize and ivsize values are in units of bits).
The full details of the IV setup can be seen in Figures 6 and 7.
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for(i=0; i<260; i++)
{
u32 x0 = EIV(0) = EIV(0)^(s&0xFF);
rotate(EIV);
swap(P(0),P(x0));
rotate(P);
Y(YMININD)=s=(s^Y(YMININD))+Y(x0);
rotate(Y);
}
s=s+Y(26)+Y(153)+Y(208);
if(s==0)
s=(keysizeb*8)+((ivsizeb*8)<<16)+0x87654321;
Figure 7. The IV Setup — Part 2 — Updating the Rolling Arrays and s.
6 Security
6.1 Design Goals
The goals of this design is to be extremely fast, as well as very secure. It was
designed to satisfy the following security properties:
1. For keys of up to 256 bits, and key streams of up to 264 bytes, no attack
can find the key, or expand a key stream, with a complexity less than of
exhaustive search.
2. There are no distinguishing attacks that succeed given less than 264 bytes
of key stream, with a complexity less than of exhaustive search.
6.2 Tests
The cipher was tested in several ways. We first checked the statistical proper-
ties of the output stream to see whether it is possible to distinguish it from a
random stream using some standard statistical tests. None of these identified
any weakness. We actually claim that the output stream is highly uncorrelated,
so that statistical tests should not succeed even when more extensive tests are
made (including tests that are specially designed for Py).
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6.3 Analysis
We then checked whether there may be a source of correlations between the
outputs through the ways they are computed. It is easy to see that the new
values in the array Y are unpredictable. The latest such updated value is used
in computation of the first output word, together with the other terms of the
formula of this output word, it is highly unlikely that this word is correlated
with future first words. Similarly, it is highly unlikely that a correlation exists
between second words and past second words (this time the fixed word location
in Y is a very old one). The case of correlation between a first word to the
second word in the same round shows that four other words, along with a
different amount of rotation of s, differentiate between them, giving a large
enough difference in the values. On the other hand, if we wait 257 steps, and try
to correlate the first word at some time to the second word 257 steps afterwards,
where the word Y [256] that is mixed in the first word becomes the Y [−1] word
that is mixed in the other, in the hope that the rest of the words would also be
similar, we find that the words that were used in the computation of the first
word are not in the array any more, and the word s would certainly be unrelated
to the content 257 steps earlier, so in such a case a correlation between the
output words is very unlikely as well.
Another direction would be to guess the values of the two indirect accesses
to Y in both outputs (one in each), subtract them from the outputs, and then
derive the XOR of both direct accesses to Y in these formulae (and eliminate
the values of s). However, since the values guessed are of indirect accesses to
Y , the attacker would not then be able to use these values in other parts of an
attack without having information on the content of P , so the attacker would
only find 32 bits of the XOR of two words by guessing 64 bits. It would be
easier to guess the 32 bits directly. In both cases the guesses cannot be verified,
so no information can be derived concerning the internal state.
The design also ensures that the following cases would not help the attacker:
1. If during the computation step of Py, in any of the output words, both
Y accesses (the direct access and the indirect access) did point to the
same entry of Y , the security may have been reduced due to possible
cancellations (probably in such a case there would be a distinguishing
attack somewhere in the range of 230–250 complexity). However, the direct
and indirect accesses always select distinct entries (−3, −1 and 256 for the
direct accesses, and entries in the range 0–255 for the indirect accesses).
2. If during the computation of s, both Y accesses pointed to the same entry,
then s would not be updated (as zero would be added). However, the way
12
the indirect accesses are designed ensures that the two indices of Y are
distinct.
3. If during the computation of s, both Y accesses pointed to the same two
entries that they pointed to in the previous step, but in the reverse order,
and if also the rotation did not rotate, then the same value of s would
be used twice with a difference of two steps. The probability for that to
happen is about 2−8 · 2−8 · 2−5 = 2−21. To make this property useful for
the attacker, the indirect accesses in one of the output words should point
to the same word of Y in those both steps, but even in that case, the
direct accesses to Y ensure that the attacker does not see similar outputs
that he can identify.
Finally, we remark that the average period of a cycle of the output of Py is
expected to be in the order of O(2|P,Y,s|), where |P, Y, s| = 10400 represents the
size of the state in bits (taking into consideration that P is a permutation, we
can compute the period to be about O(2|Y,s| · 256!) = O(28352 · 256!)).
6.4 Weak and Other Bad Keys
The designers made all efforts to ensure that no weak nor other kinds of bad
keys or IVs exist, that no related-key attacks can be performed, and that no
statistical information leaks through the key and IV schedules.
6.5 Other Kinds of Attacks
The designers believe that the standard known kinds of attacks against stream
ciphers will not work against this design. In particular, correlation attacks and
all kinds of attacks on (and bad properties of) RC4 do not work against Py.
7 Py6
We also present a second variant of Py, to which we call Py6. In this variant
the size of the values of the permutation P is reduced to a smaller number of
six bits, while reducing the sizes of P and Y to 64 and 68 entries, respectively.
The word size of Y is left unchanged. The speed of this variant is essentially
the same as the speed on Py (actually our measurements showed that it is even
very slightly faster on Pentium III), however, the smaller size of the internal
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state allows a much faster key setup and IV setup, that are very attractive for
encryption of short streams. This variant has smaller rolling arrays, thus its key
setup and IV setup are much faster than of Py, and take 796 and 1464 cycles,
respectively. The total number of cycles required by the key and IV setups is
thus smaller than the key setup of RC4, and the stream generation is about 2.5
times faster than RC4.
In this variant the difference free set had to be replaced by a difference free
set modulo 64 and modulo 68. However, there cannot be 10 numbers in such a
difference free set, thus in this variant the difference free set contains only the
six values that are used as indices to the array P . Also, in the generation of
the permutation P the internal permutation cannot be used, thus it is removed
from one location, and some rotations by eight bits are replaced by rotations by
six bits in order to ensure full mixture of the data.
As the indices in this variant are shorter, we restrict the length of the gener-
ated streams to 240. Though stream that are shorter than 70–100 bytes would
probably be faster to encrypt using the AES (or other block ciphers, due to
the longer key setup and IV setup times), this variant will encrypt stream of
120–150 bytes faster than the AES, and streams of 500 bytes over twice faster
than the AES, and over 40% faster than RC4 (including the key setup and IV
setup times).
8 Summary
In this paper we presented the stream ciphers Py and Py6, and claimed that they
are very secure as well as very fast. The cryptographic community is invited
to study their security, and we will be very glad to hear about any security (or
insecurity) results. The designers keep their rights on the design and it’s name
Py (Roo). However, no royalty will be necessary for use of Py, nor for using the
submitted code. We hope that these new ciphers will be found useful, and that
many people and applications will use it for good cause and for the benefit of
human kind.
The speed of the stream generation, key setup and IV setup of Py and Py6
on several processors is given in Table 2.
Finally, we would also wish to note that the design of Py allows for many
additional variants. In one of the additional attractive variants the array Y may
have 64-bit entries. This variant may be very attractive on 64-bit processors,
but to ensure security a small change in the step function may be needed (in
particular, additional direct or indirect accesses to Y may be necessary to ensure
14
Pentium III Alpha Sun Sparc Mac
Py 2.85/2727/4091 4.31/2618/4053 5.78/2622/5492 4.1/2891/5003
Py6 2.82/796/1464 4.55/890/1253 5.99/864/1632 4.29/1001/1982
RC4 7.3/2715/- 12.6/3270/- 13.9/4234/- 10.15/2557/-
Table 2. Speeds of Py, Py6, and RC4 on Several Kinds of Processors (NESSIE
API, entries in format stream generation in cycles/byte, key setup in cycles/key,
and IV setup in cycles/IV).
the same security level).
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A Information for Ecrypt
1. Py is a synchronous stream cipher.
2. Generates key stream in units of eight bytes.
3. The key size is in units of bytes, from one byte to 256 bytes.
4. The IV size is in units of bytes, from one byte to 64 bytes.
5. The security claims are for keys with up to 256 bits (32 bytes) and IVs up
to 128 bits (16 bytes).
6. Py is designed mainly to meet profile 1.
7. No hidden weaknesses were inserted by the designers, nor are the designers
are aware of any weakness.
8. The internal state size is 10400 bits (1300 bytes).
9. For fast implementations the internal state size may need 2084 bytes
(16656 bits). Together with keeping the result of the key setup in a rolling
array, a total of 4164 bytes may be useful. Some implementation would
keep even larger memory for the state.
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10. The keys of Py6 are limited by 64 bytes. The internal state of Py6 is 2720
bits (340 bytes). Fast implementations will usually use 548 bytes for the
state, and together with the result of the key setup the state will usually
take 1092 bytes.
11. The length of the key streams generated by Py is limited by 264 bytes.
For Py6 the streams are limited by 240 bytes.
12. The designers keep their rights on the design and it’s name Py (Roo).
However, no royalty will be necessary for use of Py, nor for using the
submitted code.
13. No patents are set by the authors to protect Py, and the authors are not
aware of any other patents that cover Py.
B Questions and Answers
1. Why Py, and why isn’t it spelled Roo?
Our tradition has been that we call new cryptographic functions after
animals, e.g., Tiger [1], Bear and Lion [2], and Serpent [3]. In this case, this
stream cipher was designed in Australia to jump around and be very fast.
Also the byte array can be viewed in some implementations as residing
inside a pouch of the word array, so the name Kangaroo is just obvious.
But we thought that a shorter name would be preferred, so we stuck to
the suffix Roo.
Then, we wished to use this opportunity to make sure people learn to read
Hebrew, so we wished to spell Roo as “   ” (read it from right to left), but
it appeared that this may be too difficult for some people to typeset. So
we decided to use the Cyrillic alphabet instead, which is much easier for
most people to use and learn. Still, for most people the Cyrillic alphabet
itself looks like a good cipher that cannot be read, just like Py.
2. How is that pronounced?
If you know Hebrew, just pronounce it as “   ”. If you know Russian
or Greek, then you know how to do it anyway. Otherwise, you should
pronounce it like the suffix of Hebrew or the suffix of Kangaroo. As long
as you make it sound different from “π” we will not complain.
3. Why did you choose this name?
Because we noticed that some people have various difficulties pronouncing
the names “  ” (i.e., Eli) and “Seberry”. (There are three messages in
this answer.)
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4. Can’t you give it another name?
Yes. We considered the name “Rijndael”, but it was already used [5]. A
bear who wishes to remain anonymous proposed the name “POOH”.
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